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11.1  Introduction 
Over the next 30 years, the ranks of the elderly are projected to increase 64 
percent, well above the 20 percent projected for the population as a whole. The 
number  of  old elderly, those  age 85 and over, is projected  to increase even 
more, by 94 percent. This growth in the elderly population, coupled with likely 
increases in the costs of long-term care, has caused policymakers to focus at- 
tention on how to most efficiently provide and pay for long-term care. 
The current  system of  long-term  care financing relies  largely on out-of- 
pocket spending by  individuals and their families and on Medicaid. There is 
no entitlement program akin to Medicare that provides long-term care for the 
elderly. Many view the current system as unsatisfactory, primarily because in 
order to qualify for government assistance,  individuals  have to reduce their 
incomes and assets to welfare levels, and because of the perceived bias in the 
system away from home care and toward nursing homes. 
Over the past decade, a number of proposed solutions have been advanced 
to increase  coverage of  long-term  care. These solutions  range from having 
Medicare provide for long-term care in the same way that acute-care benefits 
are provided, to increasing tax or other incentives for private long-term care 
insurance, to modifying the current system by  increasing the level of income 
and assets a Medicaid recipient can keep, or to moving toward a system that 
recovers any public expenditures on long-term care from the individuals’ es- 
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tates, rather than requiring  spenddown  before death (see Rivlin  and Weiner 
1988, for a discussion of a number of policy alternatives). 
Both private and public approaches to increasing long-term care insurance 
are problematic, in at least two ways. First, long-term care is difficult to define, 
and the demand for long-term care, particularly for home care, is likely to be 
quite price elastic. Thus, any increases in long-term care insurance may lead 
to large increases in long-term care demand. Second, expanding long-term care 
insurance, particularly through the public sector, may have deleterious effects 
on savings of the young and old, if much of savings is because of precaution- 
ary motives. 
This paper addresses the first of these problems. In particular, we try to an- 
swer three questions. First, how responsive is demand for nursing home care 
to price?  Second, to the extent that governments choose to ration care, how 
efficient is that rationing? And third, as governments increase access to nursing 
homes, either by increasing supply or increasing demand subsidies, what hap- 
pens to the amount of care the elderly receive in the community? 
We use the price differential between  Medicaid  and the private market to 
measure government supply policy and the existence of a spenddown provision 
for state Medicaid  funding to measure  government demand policy. We  then 
relate these two measures of  state policy to access to nursing homes by  the 
elderly, living arrangements in the community, and use of formal and informal 
care in the community. 
Our conclusions are threefold. First, both demand- and supply-side policies 
affect the utilization of nursing home care by the elderly. States with spend- 
down  allowances have greater  rates  of  nursing  home  utilization  than  states 
without these provisions, as do states with smaller Medicaid price differentials. 
Second, state policies do affect the composition of the nursing home popula- 
tion, independent of the total utilization. As Medicaid payments increase rela- 
tive to private market  prices,  poorer  people have  greater  access to nursing 
home care. In states with a spenddown provision, there is some evidence that 
the sicker elderly are more likely to be admitted to a nursing home. 
Third, the marginal source of care for persons in the community considering 
nursing home utilization appears to be support from children. One commonly 
expressed view is that the elderly admitted to nursing homes would otherwise 
live alone and without support. We find no evidence for this view. Rather, in 
states with more restrictive policies, the elderly live with their children more 
and receive more substantial help from their children. In addition, as demand 
subsidies increase or Medicaid underpayment amounts decline, the elderly are 
less likely to receive substantial help from their children on a day-to-day basis. 
We conclude from this that the moral hazard problem in subsidizing nursing 
home care is quite large and that subsidies toward institutionalization may pro- 
voke large inefficiencies. 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in the next section with a dis- 
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lighting the issues of  moral hazard in long-term care provision and the impor- 
tance of long-term care insurance for private sector savings. Section 11.3 gives 
information  about  how  different  countries  provide  long-term  care services. 
Contrary to public opinion, most countries do not provide long-term care as an 
entitlement in the same manner as they do acute medical care. Rather, almost 
all countries have some form of cost sharing in long-term care provision, many 
use a welfare method similar to the United States, and some consider children's 
income in determining long-term care subsidies. Section 11.4 provides a more 
detailed description of  how  long-term  care is financed in the United  States, 
focusing  in particular on differences  across states. We document substantial 
differences across states in the policies governments pursue toward long-term 
nursing home care. Sections 11.5 and  11.6 then use these cross-state differ- 
ences to explain differences in the amount and type of long-term care services 
actually received by the elderly. Section 11.7 concludes. 
11.2  Policy Issues for Long-Term Care 
11.2.1  Rationales for Public Involvement 
Governments in the United States are heavily involved in the financing of 
formal (i,e., paid) long-term care. In  1989, direct government expenditure on 
nursing homes was $24.3 billion, roughly 51 percent  of  total nursing home 
expenditures. The rationales for public provision of  long-term care are quite 
similar  to those  that  have been  advanced  for the public  provision  of  social 
security (see Diamond 1977, for a discussion). First, if individuals are myopic 
or not sufficiently knowledgeable  about long-term care risks, they might not 
save enough  on their own.' In  this case, social provision of  long-term  care 
might be justified, although there are a number of alternatives, including man- 
dated saving, that may be more appropriate. 
Perhaps more important, the need for long-term care is uncertain, because 
both longevity and future health status are uncertain. Thus, it is more efficient 
for people to purchase long-term care insurance than to save enough for the 
possibility of  significant long-term care needs. Because of adverse selection 
problems or large variability in the cost of care, however, the market for private 
long-term care insurance may be quite inefficient; an advantage of public pro- 
vision of  long-term  care insurance  is that  it provides efficient insurance  by 
pooling the entire population into one risk pool (Cutler 1992). 
1. In a 1984 survey, 79 percent of  the elderly thought that Medicare paid for long-term care. In 
fact, Medicare pays very little for long-term care. Recent surveys indicate that between one-quarter 
and one-half of  the elderly still have this view (Rivlin and Weiner  1988). 398  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
11.2.2  Problems with Public Provision of Long-Term Care 
Public provision of long-term care shares many of the problems of private 
insurance, however. One of the most significant problems is moral hazard. Be- 
cause long-term care services may have significant consumption value (for in- 
stance, people in nursing homes  may be provided  with meals,  laundry, and 
other services that individuals without impairments often pay for), providing 
these services at a zero or low price might encourage overconsumption of long- 
term care.* People who would otherwise manage on their own, or rely on the 
help of  their children, might choose to  use publicly provided  services were 
they available at a subsidized price.’ 
The potential for moral hazard in this market is a dominant concern because 
the size of the formal long-term care sector is so small. Only about 5 percent 
of the elderly are institutionalized at any point in time, and even among those 
85 years old and older, only one-quarter  are institutionalized  at any point in 
time. Thus, substitution to formal long-term care by even a small share of those 
currently  cared for informally  could  result  in a large increase  in long-term 
care demand. 
If  policymakers  were  able to ration  efficiently (providing  long-term  care 
only to the most medically or financially needy, for example), then moral haz- 
ard need not be a problem. However, it is very difficult to define who needs 
long-term care. Indeed, even very specific rules are likely to result in a great 
deal of  moral hazard. For instance, 66 percent of nursing home residents in 
1985 had three or more limitations in their Activities of Daily Living (ADL) 
(Price, Rimkunas, and O’Shaughnessy  1990). Only 5  percent of community 
residents over 65 had three or more ADL limitations (Rowland et al.  1988). 
Since less than 5 percent of the elderly live in nursing homes, however, roughly 
60 percent of the elderly with three or more ADL impairments live in the com- 
munity. Thus, even using quite severe impairment measures to ration eligibility 
for nursing home care will not restrict the eligible population enough to elimi- 
nate significant moral hazard. Similarly, limiting publicly provided long-term 
care assistance to those without other sources of care (for instance, to those 
without children) is likely to be both inefficient and unfair. 
Without other constraints, the moral hazard problems associated with long- 
term care insurance could lead to exorbitantly expensive public programs. The 
size of  the public program is of concern for two reasons. First, regardless of 
2. The Long-Term Care Survey, which we utilize below, also asked the elderly their view of 
nursing home care. Seven percent of  the respondents disagreed with the statement, “People go to 
nursing homes only when there is no other place to live.” Similarly, 22 percent disagreed  that, 
“Nursing homes are lonely places to live in,” and 30 percent agreed that, “There are lots of  things 
to do in a nursing home to keep people busy.” A large share of the elderly may thus be predisposed 
to enter a nursing home when they get older. 
3. Nursing home utilization could increase with increased subsidies both because the elderly 
choose nursing homes and because children might not offer to take their parents in when subsi- 
dized nursing home care is available. 399  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
whether insurance is provided publicly or privately, induced overconsumption 
of long-term care services results in an inefficient use of society’s resources. 
Second, when the program is publicly financed, the inefficiency is magnified 
by the deadweight loss associated with the taxation necessary to finance the 
program. Thus, most public programs rely on demand or supply constraints to 
limit the size of public programs. Indeed, one of the advantages of  a public 
program over a private program is the ability to restrict the supply of nursing 
home beds. 
A second problem with public provision of  long-term care is its impact on 
saving. If  potential long-term care expenses provide an important motivation 
for saving, then publicly provided long-term care may significantly reduce pri- 
vate saving. Precautionary savings motives have been highlighted by many as 
an important source of saving in the United States (Deaton  1989; Carroll and 
Summers 1991; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1992). 
The impact of public long-term care insurance on saving can be separated 
into two conceptually distinct effects. First, to the extent that individuals cur- 
rently have to save for long-term care expenses even though the likelihood of 
actually needing long-term care is  the lack of public long-term care insur- 
ance may  lead to more  saving by  the elderly. In  this case, providing public 
insurance  or improving  access  to private  insurance  for long-term  care will 
lower private  saving, even as it increases the welfare of the elderly. Second, 
public provision of long-term care services may further reduce saving relative 
to improved access to private long-term care insurance, because long-term care 
services are likely to be financed on a pay-as-you go basis. 
Countering the effects on the amount of precautionary savings is the current 
system of  means-tested  public  funding of  long-term  care.5 All  states in the 
United States have income and asset tests to determine Medicaid eligibility for 
publicly funded long-term care (described in more detail in section 11.4). This 
system of means-tested public insurance imposes a significant tax on savings 
by the elderly; with some probability, all of  their savings will be spent on an 
item which the government would have provided had they not saved. While the 
unconditional probability of  entering a nursing home for an extended period 
of time is low (so the incentive to reduce saving is also low), the probability of 
entering a nursing home may become less uncertain as a person ages. The tax 
effect of Medicaid provision may increase with age. If this effect is large, pub- 
licly provided long-term care insurance may increase saving among the elderly. 
This paper does not provide empirical tests of the impact of  government 
long-term care policies on saving. Many of the effects on saving should be the 
same as those of the public provision of Social Security benefits. Unlike Social 
4.  Kemper and Murtaugh (1991) estimate that 43 percent of the people who turn age 65 in 1990 
5.  This argument is the same as that advanced by Feldstein (1987) about the ambiguous effects 
will use a nursing home before they die. 
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Security, however, long-term care policies differ by  state. In principle,  then, 
the methodology we use to test the effects of government policies on moral 
hazard can also be used to test the effects on saving. We anticipate returning 
to this issue in future work. Before discussing the effects of  state policies on 
nursing home use and living arrangements, however, we first discuss the long- 
term care financing mechanisms of other countries. 
11.3  International Evidence on the Financing of Long-term Care6 
Most developed countries provide government financing of a much larger 
share of  acute medical care than  does the United  States. Australia, Canada, 
France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, for example, all insure 100 percent 
of the population publicly, and other countries, such as Germany and the Neth- 
erlands, insure most  of the population. Typically, such coverage is provided 
without private premiums and with small or no patient deductibles or copay- 
ments. The United States, in contrast, provides government insurance for less 
than 25 percent of its population. 
Unlike the provision of  acute medical care, however, long-term care provi- 
sion in the United States is much more similar to that in other countries. Most 
countries impose some form of cost sharing for nursing home care, and many 
have spenddown features similar to those of the United States. Table 1  1.1 pro- 
vides evidence on the types of financing employed by various countries. The 
table divides the countries into two groups: those that provide long-term care 
on a welfare basis (i.e., recipients of government subsidies need to meet certain 
income or asset requirements) and those that provide it on an entitlement basis. 
The first set of countries leaves a substantial share of long-term care financing 
to the individual. In Belgium and France, for example, the government pays 
for the medical component of long-term care, but individuals are responsible 
for room and board.’ In Germany and the United States, the individual may be 
responsible for the entire cost of long-term care, and in Germany, children may 
also have to contribute to long-term care for their parents before the govern- 
ment pays for care. 
In each of these countries, there are provisions for government payment of 
care for the poor elderly. In France and Germany, individuals qualify for public 
funding if either gross income or income net of medical expenses is below a 
given cutoff. All states in the United States have a gross income means test, 
and many, although not all, states have a net income means test as well. The 
process of  qualifying  for public funds because  of  high  medical expenses  is 
termed “spenddown” in the United States. 
Thus, even  in  the  “welfare”  countries,  many  residents  of  long-term  care 
6. This discussion draws heavily on information in Doty (1988, 1990) and Schwab (1989). 
7.  On average, the French government  pays approximatyely  14 percent of  the cost of long-ter 
are. Table 11.1  Payment for Long-Term Care in Different Countries 
Institutionalization 
Country  Rate (%)  Qualifications for Public Funding 























4.  I 
Government pays medical component only; consumer pays residential 
component 
Government pays medical component only; consumer pays residential 
component; means test for public funding of  consumer share 
Consumer and children responsible for care; means test for public 
funds 
Consumer responsible for costs; means test (income and assets) for 
public funds; spenddown provision in many states 
Consumer fee fixed at 87.5 percent of social security pension 
Consumer pays maximum social security pension less a fixed amount 
Consumer pays social security pension plus share of other income 
Skilled homes (AWBZ) covered under national health insurance with 
(60-80  percent) 
little cost sharing; spenddown provision for less medicalized 
facilities 
Consumer pays 10 percent of  cost 
Consumer pays social security pension plus share of other income 
National Health Service hospitals and Local Authority old-age homes 
(60-80  percent) 
paid by government; means test for private old-age homes 
Note: The table shows the institutionalization rate and mechanisms for public assistance. 
Sources: International descriptions are from Doty (1988, 1990), and Schwab (1988). 
"Utilization rate does not count long-term care provided in general hospitals. 402  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
facilities receive some government assistance. For instance, in both France and 
Germany, roughly 50 percent of residents in nursing homes and old-age homes 
receive some public support. In the United States, public financing of institu- 
tional long-term care accounts for roughly 50 percent of all formal long-term 
care costs. 
The second set of countries pays for at least part of  long-term  care as an 
entitlement rather than strictly on a welfare basis.  Generally, the consumer’s 
part of long-term care is fixed relative to income: either social security income 
(Australia and Canada) or total income (Denmark, Japan, and Sweden).*  As a 
result, all elderly receive some amount of public funding. Even in countries 
that use an entitlement method to reimburse nursing home care, however, it is 
striking that all of the countries require significant cost sharing on the part of 
the individual. In many of these countries (Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, e.g.), there is little or no private payment required for acute medi- 
cal care.9 
Institutionalization rates vary from 3.5 to 6.5 percent of the elderly popula- 
tion for the welfare countries and from 4 to 11 percent of the elderly population 
for the entitlement countries, suggesting at least some link between more gen- 
erous public funding of nursing homes and the share of the population that is 
institutionalized. The link, however, is difficult to test formally with only a few 
countries. Further, as Doty (1990) notes, some of this relation is misleading. 
In  the Netherlands,  for example,  where  the  institutionalization  rate  is  very 
high, about three-quarters of the population is in forms of care which are run 
under the welfare method rather than the entitlement  method. In the United 
Kingdom,  only  20  percent  of  the institutionalized  elderly  are  in  National 
Health  Service hospitals  (which are covered  as inpatient  care); most of  the 
remainder  have  some cost  sharing for long-term  care. Indeed, a potentially 
more important policy in explaining international differences in nursing home 
utilization, which is not included here, is government restrictions on nursing 
home beds. The policy decisions of governments in setting nursing home bed 
capacity appear to be as important as cost-sharing provisions on the demand 
side in regulating nursing home use (Doty 1988). 
The conclusion from table 11.1 is thus that many countries have very similar 
long-term care policies. Contrary to the financing of acute medical care, the 
United States is not a large outlier in its financing of long-term care. In  fact, 
almost all countries require significant cost sharing, and many have means test- 
ing similar to the United States. To a great extent, this similarity in long-term 
care provision is due to the difficulty in identifying the group most in need of 
long-term care. Unlike acute care hospital admissions, the need for long-term 
8. Prior to the early  1980s, many provinces  in Canada had a spenddown system similar to the 
United  States. With the provision of  more central government  financing of  long-term care in the 
1960s and  1970s, most  provinces  moved  to an  entitlement basis for  payment  (Kane and  Kane 
1985). 
9. Although some services, such as private hospital rooms, are only available at private expense. 403  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
care is not necessarily indicated by a discrete event. Further, many elderly need 
help only  with  some tasks, so that  institutionalization  may not be the most 
appropriate site of  care even for those with disabilities. Finally, the potential 
for moral hazard in long-term care is much greater than for acute medical care. 
Given these difficulties with long-term care provision, it is not surprising that 
countries have generally not chosen to include long-term care as a benefit pro- 
vided by national health insurance. 
The natural question from the international data is the extent to which these 
financial and supply decisions affect nursing home utilization  and long-term 
care provision outside of  nursing homes. Data to answer this question, how- 
ever, are generally unavailable across countries. In the next sections, we exam- 
ine U.S. data on state policies and the provision  of long-term care to address 
these questions. 
11.4  Long-Term Care Financing in the United States 
In the United States, most assistance provided to the disabled elderly is in- 
formal and unpaid. Little information is available about the costs of that care. 
More information  is available on formal long-term  care. Formal care is  fi- 
nanced partly by private payers and partly by government. Table ll  .2 presents 
a breakdown of  sources of  payment for formal care. In  1989, Medicaid paid 
directly for 43 percent of nursing home costs. However, this number underesti- 
mates the impact of the Medicaid program on nursing home expenditures, be- 
cause an additional  18 percent of nursing home expenditures are financed by 
the incomes of residents on Medicaid who are also receiving Medicaid assis- 
tance. Thus, over 61 percent of nursing home expenditures are paid by Medic- 
aid  or  by  residents  on  Medicaid.  Out-of-pocket  expenditures  by  wholly 
private-pay patients’O account for only 26 percent of  nursing home expendi- 
tures. Medicare pays for only 7.5 percent of nursing home spending, and the 
remaining 5 percent of spending is from insurance and other sources. 
Medicaid is thus the dominant government program for nursing home care. 
State Medicaid policies  differ considerably,  however. States participating in 
the Medicaid program have leeway to decide the groups that are eligible and 
the payment structure for these services. We describe these state policies in the 
remainder of this section. 
11.4.1 
The Federal Medicaid program requires states with Medicaid programs’’ to 
provide  Medicaid  to “categorically eligible”  individuals. For the  elderly in 
State Differences in Medicaid Eligibility 
10. Actually, some of the other out-of-pocket expenditures are contributed by people on Medi- 
care who are paying their deductible or copayment. 
11. All  states currently have Medicaid programs. However, Arizona’s program  only recently 
moved from being a “demonstration project” to a certified Medicaid program. Long-term care in 
Arizona was not  provided  through the  state’s Medicaid demonstration project until  January  1, 
1989, and is therefore not discussed here. 404  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
Table 11.2  Sources of Payment for Nursing Homes, 1989 
Source 
Payment  Percentage 




Nursing home residents on Medicaid 




















Source: Lazenby and Letsch (1990). 
most states, categorical eligibility is defined as countable income (income less 
$20 per month) below the maximum Supplemental Security Income (SSI) ben- 
efit in the state. Because SSI benefits for individuals who are institutionalized 
are very low (a maximum  of $30 per month in  1988), only individuals with 
very low incomes  can receive categorical coverage from Medicaid  while in 
an institution. Indeed, while 80 percent of the noninstitutionalized  Medicaid 
recipients qualify under categorical eligibility, only 22 percent of the institu- 
tionalized Medicaid recipients qualify based on categorical eligibility. 
A small set of  states-those  that had more restrictive cash assistance pro- 
grams for the elderly before SSI was enacted-are  allowed to use these more 
restrictive criteria in place of the categorical eligibility rules. These states are 
termed  “209(b)”  states, the designation  of  the waiver option for this group. 
Currently, 14 states determine Medicaid eligibility using this option. 
In  addition to  categorical  eligibility,  states are permitted  to cover certain 
optional groups of people. All  states (except Arizona)  cover at least one of 
these optional groups. For the elderly, these options are generally of two forms. 
The first is a “medically needy” program. Under this system, individuals are 
allowed to subtract their medical expenses from their income before applying 
the Medicaid income test.” In  1987, 36 states had a medically needy program 
for at least  some component of  the population,  but not  all of the programs 
applied to the elderly. Two states (Georgia and Texas) did not cover the elderly 
at all, six states (Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Okla- 
homa) covered the elderly but excluded long-term care,I4 and one state (New 
12. In  1986, out of 6.2 million Medicaid recipients, 4.1 million received cash assistance. Out of 
1.5 million Medicaid recipients in intermediate care facilities (ICFs) or skilled nursing facilities 
(SNFs). only 330,000 received cash assistance (Carpenter 1988). 
13. The maximum income allowed under this option is  133 percent of  the state’s maximum 
AFDC payment for a family of the same size. 
14. Medicaid also pays the hospital deductible, physician copayment, and other expenses such 
as prescription drugs for recipients. These six states covered only those services for the elderly. 405  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
Hampshire) covered skilled nursing facilities but not intermediate care facili- 
ties.  In  addition,  three  states with 209(b) programs  (Indiana, Missouri,  and 
Ohio) were required  to allow individuals to subtract their medical expenses 
from their income before applying the income test, making the plan effectively 
similar to a medically needy program.15 
Table 11.3 shows the composition of states with medically needy programs 
in  1987. The first column indicates whether the state had a medically needy 
program or the equivalent for long-term care.16 The second and third columns 
report the income and asset tests” that are applied for Medicaid coverage. In 
1987, maximum monthly income was on the order of $400 to $500, and maxi- 
mum assets were approximately $2,000. 
The second optional group that states can cover are people with  incomes 
higher than the SSI limits. States are permitted to choose an income limit up 
to 300 percent of the state SSI benefit as an income eligibility standard-in 
effect superseding the categorical eligibility criterion.’*  In 1988, 19 states used 
this option; these states are also detailed in table  11.3. These higher income 
limits averaged about $1,000 per month in 1987. 
Once eligibility is determined, individuals are expected to spend most of 
their income to pay for their nursing home bills. Medicaid will only pay the 
difference between the Medicaid  rate and the individual’s required contribu- 
tion. The amount of income that individuals are allowed to keep varies slightly 
across states, but in general is quite low, ranging between $30 and $75 in 1991. 
Hence, for most individuals  receiving  Medicaid, the price of  nursing home 
care is their full income. 
11.4.2  Modeling State Policies: Demand and Supply Factors 
To examine the effect of state policies on nursing home utilization and com- 
munity support, we relate long-term care receipt to differences in state policies. 
Only a limited amount of existing work deals with public policies affecting 
nursing home utilization. Liu, Coughlin, and McBride (1991) estimate hazard 
models for nursing home admission, including the number of beds per  1,000 
elderly  and  the Medicaid  nursing  home reimbursement  rate  as explanatory 
variables. They conclude that increased bed supply increases the probability 
of  nursing home use, and that increased Medicaid payment rates lowers the 
probability of  nursing home use. They interpret this latter finding as a negative 
demand elasticity for nursing home care, if the Medicaid payment rate is corre- 
lated with the private market price. 
15. The other 1 I  “209(b)” states already have a medically needy program for the elderly. 
16. Two of  the 30 states (Oregon and Tennessee) began their medically needy programs for the 
elderly  in  1986, after our micro data end. For our empirical work, we thus  have  28 states with 
medically needy programs or the equivalent. 
17. The asset tests exclude the value of an owned home. 
18. The special SSI income limit may be on either gross income or on  income net of  the $7.0 
disregard. We do not distinguish between these two cases. 406  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
Table 11.3  Eligibility Criteria for Long-Term Care, 1987 
Medically Needy 
Income  Asset  Special 
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Table 11.3  (continued) 
Medically Needy 
State 
Income  Asset  Special 
Program  Standard ($)  Standard ($)  SSI Limits ($) 
Vermont  Yes  432  1,800 
Virginia  Yes  345  1,800 
Washington  Yes  388  1,800 
West Virginia  Yes  220  1,800 
Wyoming  No  1,020 
Wisconsin  Yes  463  1,800 
Source: Carpenter (1988); Neuschler and Gill (1986). 
Note: Resource standards are for single people. 
5tate has a 209(b) program which bases eligibility on income net of medical spending. 
bState covers skilled nursing facilities but not intermediate care facilities. 
Garber and MaCurdy (1991) provide evidence that Medicare payment rules 
affect the duration of nursing home admissions. If  a nursing home admission 
qualifies for Medicare payment, Medicare pays for all of the first 20 days, im- 
poses a copayment for days 21-100,  and pays nothing beyond 100 days. Using 
the  variation  in  prices  associated  with  the  100-day  Medicare  termination, 
Garber and  MaCurdy  estimate a fivefold increase in the  nursing  home dis- 
charge date in the period around 100 days after admission. 
Newman et al. (1990) examine the effect of nursing home vacancy rates and 
the presence of  formal and informal care on nursing home admissions. They 
find that increased vacancy  rates increase nursing home utilization, but find 
only mixed evidence on the substitution of formal and informal care for nurs- 
ing home care. While informal care appears substitutable for nursing home 
care, individuals with paid  caregivers  are more likely to experience nursing 
home admissions than those without. 
In our empirical work, we have tried to find policy  variables  that capture 
both  exogenous demand  and supply for nursing home care. Because  states 
choose whether to implement these policies, it is impossible to be sure that 
they are truly exogenous. It may be that states with higher demand for nursing 
home care are more likely to provide greater subsidies and encourage supply. 
Because we include so many demographic and financial characteristics of the 
individuals, however, it seems unlikely that unmeasured demand accounts for 
our results about the effects of state policies. 
The measure of demand we use is the presence of  a medically needy pro- 
gram. This measures the ability of some higher-income individuals to qualify 
for Medicaid on the basis of large medical care expenses. Although the income 
eligibility criteria vary across states, this variation is relatively small compared 
with the difference between being able to deduct medical expenses from in- 
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Measuring supply is trickier. In the past, many states restricted the supply 
of  nursing  home  beds.  This was  done both  explicitly,  by  requiring  nursing 
homes to apply for Certificates of  Need before increasing the number of nurs- 
ing home beds, and implicitly, by  maintaining a low Medicaid payment rate 
relative to private rates. Because nursing home occupancy rates are generally 
quite high (the national average was about 95 percent in 1982) and most nurs- 
ing homes  maintain  waiting lists  (Norton 1992), it  is often  argued that  the 
supply constraints are binding. 
If supply is not completely exogenous, however, it is inappropriate to use the 
number of beds per elderly as an explanatory variable in an equation predicting 
nursing  home  usage.I9 We  thus  do not  use a measure  of  bed  supply  in the 
equations. One variable which may affect nursing home supply, however, is 
the Medicaid underpayment amount, the difference between the private market 
price and the Medicaid per diem. The underpayment amount may have a num- 
ber of effects on nursing home utilization. First, construction of nursing homes 
may be lower in states where Medicaid compensation is low. Second, nursing 
homes have a greater incentive to wait for private-pay or low-cost (low-need) 
patients in states with low Medicaid reimbursement. 
Medicaid  underpayments  may  also change the quality  of  nursing  homes, 
thus affecting the demand for care. The direction of this effect is unclear, how- 
ever. If  there is an unlimited supply of  Medicaid patients at any quality level, 
higher Medicaid compensation may be associated with a lower quality of care 
(Scanlon 1980;  Gertler 1989).  The higher the Medicaid compensation rate, the 
less nursing homes care about private patients and thus the lower their quality. 
Alternatively,  if there is a limited supply of  Medicaid  patients or if  nursing 
homes act partly on an altruistic basis (increases in revenue are spent on in- 
creases in quality rather than greater profits), higher Medicaid payments may 
lead to higher quality and thus greater nursing home demand. Indeed, there is 
some anecdotal  evidence that  states with low Medicaid  compensation  rates 
have low quality. Low payment rates have been blamed for the poor condition 
of nursing homes in California and Texas, for example (Little 1992). 
We use the underpayment amount in  1987, the earliest year for which data 
are available; we suspect that the relative payment levels across states are rea- 
sonably constant over time. Although this variable may pick up both demand 
and supply factors, the results below suggest that it generally proxies for sup- 
ply effects. 
19. We considered two variables as possible instruments for bed supply. First, we tried the share 
of Medicaid expenditures that are paid by the federal government. However, because this share is 
a nonlinear function of per capita income in a state. it is correlated with income and hence with 
demand for nursing home care. Empirically, the higher the federal share, the higher the bed supply. 
The second variable we considered was the approval rate of Certificate of Need applications (mea- 
sured in dollars of construction proposed). Although this variable is positively related to bed sup- 
ply, it might also be correlated with demand, because  states with high demand may  approve a 
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If  supply is constrained,  then increasing  demand by  expanding Medicaid 
eligibility will affect the composition but not the total number of nursing home 
residents.  Because nursing homes generally  have leeway to select who gets 
admitted to nursing homes and who does not and because most nursing homes 
are for-profit businesses,  nursing homes may not ration care efficiently, but 
may rather choose to admit those patients with the highest incomes and the 
lowest  expected costs. Previous  studies  have  found  evidence  that  nursing 
homes  do indeed discriminate  against  patients  with  significant  caretaking 
needs (Ettner 1991; U.S. General Accounting Office 1990; Norton 1992). This 
is particularly  true  in states where the Medicaid  payment is independent  of 
the patient case mix. We thus examine how the state policies affect the com- 
position  of  nursing home  utilization  in  addition to the aggregate  utilization 
rate. 
Finally, we also include as a policy variable the existence of  a home care 
waiver. Under  Medicaid, states  that  wish  to  provide  Medicaid  funding  for 
home care services must apply to the federal government for a waiver. Since 
such waivers were relatively  new  during the period of  our data, we  suspect 
they will have little effect on nursing home utilization. 
Table 11.4 shows summary statistics for the measures of state policy. We use 
data from the 45 states for which all data are available.20  Panel A of the table 
reports summary statistics on state policies. About 55 percent of the states have 
medically needy programs or the equivalent. Medicaid underpayments average 
about $10 per day, or roughly 22 percent of the average cost of a nursing home. 
The variation in the underpayment  amount is also large. Minnesota pays for 
Medicaid use of nursing homes at the private market rate, while Colorado has 
an  underpayment  of  approximately  $25  per  day  relative  to private  market 
prices. 
Panel B of the table shows cross correlations of the state policies. Measures 
of state generosity are positively correlated. States with a medically needy pro- 
gram are likely to have lower underpayments (i.e., the Medicaid rate is closer 
to the private rate) and are also more likely to have home care waivers. One 
natural hypothesis-that  states with generous supply policies implement more 
restrictive demand controls-is  not supported by the data. Rather, the results 
suggest that  states that are more generous  along the supply margin are also 
more generous with demand subsidies. 
11.5  Determinants of Nursing Home Utilization 
In this section, we examine the effect of state factors on utilization of nurs- 
ing homes. We focus both on total nursing home use and on use among differ- 
20. Unfortunately, data on Underpayment amounts are not available for the District of Columbia, 
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Table 11.4  Summary Statistics on State Nursing Home Policies 
A. Summary Statistics 
Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Medically needy  .55  SO  0  1 
Medicaid underpayment  10.0  4.6  0  25 
Home care waiver  .47  SO  0  1 
(dollars per day) 
B. Cross  Correlations 
Medically  Medicaid 
Needy  Underpayment  Home Care Waiver 
Medically needy  1.000 
Medicaid underpayment  -.I03  1.000 
Home care waiver  .250  . I22  1.000 
Note: The table shows the means and correlations between the state policy variables. All statistics 
use the 45 states for which data on all variables are available, 
ent components of the population. We begin with a summary of the micro data 
and then present equations for the determinants of nursing home use. 
11.5.1  National Long-Term Care Survey 
The primary micro data we employ is the National Long-Tern Care Survey 
(NLTCS). The NLTCS is a panel of  the disabled elderly from  1982 to 1984. 
The survey selected individuals in 1982 with some chronic impairment in Ac- 
tivities of  Daily  Living  (ADLs) or Instrumental  Activities  of  Daily  Living 
(IADLs) who  were  living in the community in  1982.21  Individuals  meeting 
the criterion (6,088 total) were given  extensive interviews  about health  and 
demographic  factors. While  the sample is a random sample of  the disabled 
elderly population, there is little reason to believe that the selection on disabil- 
ity status biases our results. Indeed, the NLTCS has been used by a number of 
researchers to study medical influences on nursing home admissions (Hanley 
et al. 1990; Liu et al. 1991), the probability of spenddown to receive Medicaid 
(Liu and Manton  1989; Liu, Doty, and Manton 1990), the transition of  the 
elderly among states of disability (Liu, Manton, and Liu 1990; Manton 1988), 
21. There are nine potential ADLS: eating, getting in or out of bed, getting in or out of chairs, 
walking around inside, going outside, dressing, bathing, using the toilet, and controlling bowel 
movements or urination. There are seven potential IADLs: preparing meals, doing laundry, doing 
light housework, shopping for groceries, keeping track of bills and handling cash, taking medicine, 
and making telephone calls. 
Additional respondents were added to the survey in 1984, to make it more representative of the 
nation at that time. Since there is no information  for these people on health or living status in 
1982, we do not include them in the sample. 411  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
and discrimination between Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients in nursing 
home admissions (Ettner 1991). 
The NLTCS reinterviewed these individuals in 1984, obtaining 5,795 com- 
plete  responses. The  1984 reinterview  had  three  components:  a community 
questionnaire for those not institutionalized (4,182 persons), a separate ques- 
tionnaire  for  those  institutionalized  (4 14 persons),  and  a questionnaire  an- 
swered by the next of kin for those who had died (1,199 persons). 
Total nursing home utilization is the sum of utilization for the three types of 
people. Since everyone in the nursing home in 1984 was admitted in the pre- 
ceding two years, this group automatically counts as nursing home users. De- 
termining use among the other two groups is more difficult. We use two selec- 
tion criteria. First, we include people who reported entering (or whose next of 
kin reported that the person entered) a nursing home after the survey month in 
1982. Second,  we  included  people  who reported  having  been  in a nursing 
home before the 1984 survey but who had never been in a nursing home prior 
to the 1982 survey, even if the person did not know the specific date of nursing 
home entry. While this undoubtedly underestimates the extent of nursing home 
utilization, there is no other alternative given these data. 
To  provide  some evidence  on the  types  of  nursing  home use, table  11.5 
shows the distribution of nursing home use by status in 1984. All told, almost 
15 percent of the people were admitted to a nursing home between  1982 and 
1984. As the third column shows, however, the distribution of nursing home 
stays appears bifurcated between short-term stayers (those who return to the 
community  shortly  or die) and  long-term  stayers (those still in the  nursing 
home or who die without returning to the community). About 4.5 percent of 
the community residents in  1984 had used a nursing home in the intervening 
two years, and over 20 percent of those who were dead in 1984 used a nursing 
home prior to death. These two groups thus account for about one-half of nurs- 
ing home spells over the two-year period. Past research has emphasized the 
size of this  short-stay  population  in evaluating the importance of  Medicaid 
spenddown for nursing home residents (Liu and Manton 1989). 
To control for individual determinants of nursing home use, we use a variety 
of  demographic characteristics drawn from past studies.22  The characteristics 
are of three types. First, we include demographic information on the individ- 
ual: sex, age, race (white or nonwhite), number of children (number truncated 
to five), and an indicator for not being married. Past research has suggested 
that older individuals are more likely to enter a nursing home, as are women 
and whites (Garber and MaCurdy 1989). People without children are also more 
likely to enter a nursing home, as are people who are not married (Wan and 
Weissert 1981). 
Second, we use financial data: income of the disabled person and spouse (if 
22. See Hanley et  al. (1990) and Garber and MaCurdy (1989) for more discussion of  these 
factors. 412  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
Table 11.5  Characteristics of Nursing Home Use by Status, 1984 
Sample Population  Nursing Home Use 
Percentage  Percentage with  Percentage of 
Status in  1984  Number  of  Total  Some Use  Total Use 
In community  4,182  72.2  4.5  21.9 
In nursing home  414  7.1  100.0  48.2 
Dead  1,199  20.7  21.4  29.9 
Totdl  5,795  100.0  14.8  100.0 
married), whether the person  owns a home, and total dividend  and  interest 
income (which is also included in total income). We  interpret the coefficient 
on dividend and interest income as a measure of wealth, independent  of  in- 
come flow. Past research has suggested that individuals with lower incomes 
are more likely to be admitted to a nursing home (Cohen, Tell, and Wallick 
1986), although private-pay patients may have above average income (Scanlon 
1980). Home owners appear substantially less likely to enter a nursing home 
(Garber and MaCurdy  1990). Asset income is generally positively  related to 
nursing home admission (Hanley et al. 1990). 
Finally, we use a number of indicators of health status: the number of times 
the person was in the hospital in the year prior to the survey, whether the person 
has any IADLs, the  number of ADLs the person has,2' the number of  prior 
times the person has been in the nursing home, whether the person has ever 
had a stroke, and whether the person has ever had a broken hip. Past research 
has suggested that the probability of  nursing home admission increases with 
measures of functional disability and poor physical or mental health (Cohen et 
al. 1986; Shapiro and Tate 1988). 
Table 11.6 shows summary statistics for the individual characteristics. From 
the  sample of 45  states discussed  above, we  omit people without  adequate 
income data.24  The resulting sample is 4,374 persons. The average age is al- 
most 77 years, and the sample is dominated by women (two-thirds of the sam- 
ple) and whites. Average income is just over $8,000, with about $700 in divi- 
dend and interest income. About 58 percent of the people own their own house, 
an estimate close to that in Sheiner and Weil (1991). Finally, the group is less 
healthy  than the elderly population at large. The average number of  hospital 
visits in the past year is over one-half, with an average of one-tenth of a stay in 
a nursing home. Over 7 percent of the population has had a stroke, and over 2 
percent a broken hip. 
23. This specification for IADLs and ADLs is similar to that in Hanley et al. (1990). 
24. We excluded persons  if  they  refused  to answer questions  about  Social Security income, 
pension income, or other annuity income for themselves or their spouse. 413  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
Table 11.6  Summary Statistics for Individual Characteristics 
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Nore: Each row is based on 4,374 observations for which all data are available 
11  S.2 
To examine the determinants of nursing home utilization, we estimate logit 
models for any nursing home use over the two-year interval. The dependent 
variable is the log odds of the probability that a person was admitted to a nurs- 
ing home between  1982 and 1984. The independent variables are the individ- 
ual and state factors noted above. Denoting the probability  of nursing home 
use  as pYh, the probability  of  no use p:""'e (=  1 -  pYh), and the  individual 
characteristics as X,, the equation we estimate is of the form: 
(1) 
Factors Affecting Aggregate Nursing Home Utilization 
log(pYh) -  log(py  use)  = XI X  f3  + y1  X  MEDNEED, + y2 
X UNDPAY, + cz, 
where i denotes the individual andj  is the state in which the individual resides. 
Our explanatory variables are all from the 1982 survey. If patient characteris- 
tics change over time (such as marital  or health  status), one might want  to 
allow for these changes. An alternative approach is thus to use data from 1984 
as the explanatory variables.25  Unfortunately, data on changes in demographic 
status are not generally available for those who were dead in 1984. Further, the 
data do not permit us to examine the timing of health status changes and nurs- 
25. Alternatively, one might specify a hazard model of nursing home entry and incorporate the 
nursing home admissions of those who subsequently died. Since there are no data on individual 
characteristics between 1982 and 1984,  however, the hazard models could not allow for time varia- 
tion in the individual characteristics. We thus use the simpler logit formulation. 414  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
ing home use for those who are alive in  1984. We  thus use the  1982 data to 
measure individual characteristics. 
Table  11.7 reports  estimates  of  the probability  of  nursing  home use as a 
function of the state and individual characteristics. The first three columns re- 
port the results with the state policy variables included  individually; the last 
two columns include the state policies jointly. In all of the equations, the indi- 
vidual characteristics are very important in explaining nursing home use. Older 
people are more likely to enter a nursing home, as are whites and people with 
fewer children.  Given  health and demographic  characteristics,  men  are less 
likely to enter a nursing home than are women, although this result is not statis- 
tically significant.26  Being married has no effect on the probability of  nursing 
home entry conditional on health and demographic factors. 
Richer people are less likely to enter a nursing home than are poor people, 
as are people who own a house, although only the latter finding is statistically 
significant. In equations without  the health and demographic  characteristics 
(not reported), richer people are statistically significantly less likely to enter a 
nursing home than are poorer people, with a coefficient twice as large as the 
reported  coefficient^.^' This finding suggests that at least some of the explana- 
tory power of  income in predicting medical care use is related to underlying 
health or attitudes toward nursing homes, rather than an exogenous effect of 
income. People with greater dividend and interest income are more likely to 
enter a nursing home, although this result is also not statistically significant. 
The dichotomy  between  home ownership  and financial wealth suggests that 
the two are not substitutable in the nursing home decision. 
Almost all of the health status measures are significantly related to nursing 
home use, in the expected direction. Individuals with IADLs are more likely 
to enter a nursing home than are those without, as are individuals with greater 
numbers of ADLs. Having had a stroke is also positively and statistically sig- 
nificantly related to subsequent use. Prior nursing home use or having suffered 
a broken hip are associated with greater nursing home use, although these re- 
sults are not statistically significant. 
The coefficients on the  state policy  variables  support the hypothesis  that 
these policies are important determinants of nursing home use. The presence 
of a medically needy program is positively  related to nursing home use (col. 
[l]). To  evaluate  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  (and the  state  policies 
throughout  the paper), we evaluate the change in the probability  of  nursing 
home use for a “typical” elderly individuaL2*  The estimates imply that adding 
26. Hanley et al. (1990) reach similar conclusions about the relative entry probability of men 
27. With just the  financial  variables included  in  the  equation,  the coefficient  on income  is 
28. The individual is female, aged 75-79,  white, with two children, and married. Total family 
income is $8,000, with $700 of dividend and interest income. The person owns her own home. 
The person had one hospital visit in the past year, at least one IADL, and two ADLs. The person 
had not suffered a stroke or broken hip. 
and women. 
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Table 11.7  Predictions of Nursing Home Use by the Elderly-Dependent 
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Table 11.7  (continued) 
Equation 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Change in probability of use (percentage points) 
Medically needy  2.49  -  -  3.31  2.92 
Medicaid underpayment  -1.71  -1.71  -  1.64 
Home care waiver  -1.16  -  I .05  -  .99 
Number of observations  4,374  4,374  4,374  4,374  4.374 
Log likelihood  -1,651  -1,649  -1,653  -1,645  -1,635 
-  - 
-  - 
Note: The table reports logit equations for the probability of nursing home use as a function of 
demographics, financial and health status, and state policy variables. Standard errors are in paren- 
theses. 
*Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 10 percent level. 
**Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 5 percent level. 
a medically needy program increases the probability of nursing home use by 
about 2.5  percentage points over the two-year period. Since about  15 percent 
of the disabled elderly entered a nursing home over the two-year period, this 
change is over 15 percent of the mean utilization rate, a reasonably large effect. 
This finding suggests both that nursing home demand  increases  when  more 
people are eligible for the subsidy and that either bed supply is not effectively 
constrained or state bed supply policy is responsive to anticipated increases in 
demand. To the extent that bed supply is a constraint on utilization, however, 
the coefficient on the medically needy variable is then an underestimate of  the 
true effect on demand. 
The Medicaid underpayment rate is negatively and statistically significantly 
related to nursing home use (col. [2]).  A one standard deviation increase in the 
Medicaid underpayment amount ($4.6 per day) lowers the probability of nurs- 
ing home utilization by about 1.7 percentage points. Finally, the existence of a 
home care waiver program has no effect on nursing home use (col. [3]). Be- 
cause home care waivers do not predict nursing home utilization, we drop this 
policy variable from the remainder of the analysis. 
Column (4) shows the results with all three state policy measures included 
in the equation. The coefficients are roughly the same, indicating that the med- 
ically needy and Medicaid underpayment amounts both affect utilization. Evi- 
dently, the policy effects are not just picking up some unmeasured  aspect of 
demand that is correlated with both policy variables. 
Column (5)  includes a measure of ex post health status-whether  the person 
was dead in 1984-to  account for unobserved variation in underlying health. 
As table 11.5 indicated, individuals are substantially more likely to have used 
a nursing home between 1982 and 1984. Controlling for individual characteris- 417  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
tics, people who are dead in 1984 are substantially more likely to have used a 
nursing home. The coefficients on the policy variables, however, are essentially 
unchanged in this specification. To the extent we can control for patient hetero- 
geneity, therefore, such heterogeneity does not appear to explain our results. 
We  also experimented  with a variety of other predictors  of nursing home 
use. One important measure is an indicator of senility. Garber and Macurdy 
(1989) show that elderly displaying signs of  senility are much more likely to 
use a nursing home than those without these signs. Adding  an indicator for 
senility did predict nursing home use,29  but had little effect on the coefficients 
on state policy. Since not all people were given the same test for senility, we 
do not report these results. 
In addition, we estimated equations including state factors such as the num- 
ber of days of  snow in the major city in the state. Areas with more snow are 
likely to be less hospitable for disabled elderly attempting to live in the com- 
munity. The measure  of the amount of  snow was positively  and statistically 
significantly related  to nursing  home use in the absence of  the state policy 
variables. Including the policy  variables, however, substantially  reduced  the 
coefficient on the amount of snow, and the resulting estimate was statistically 
insignificantly different from zero.3o  The coefficients on the medically needy 
variable were smaller in this specification, with a larger standard error, while 
the  coefficient  on  the  Medicaid  underpayment  was  essentially  unchanged. 
States seem to choose to have medically  needy programs when the value of 
nursing home care is high. 
11  S.3 
The effects of  state policies on the composition of  nursing home residents 
may be as large as those on the total number of admissions. In particular, when 
states have medically needy programs, it is likely that middle income and dis- 
abled individuals will have a greater demand for nursing home care. If nursing 
home bed supply does not increase as much as demand, then lower income 
individuals are likely to find access to nursing home care more difficult. 
Similarly, Medicaid  underpayments  could also affect  the mix  of  patients. 
When nursing home payment is limited, nursing homes could choose to ration 
according to a “first-come, first-served‘’ rule. In this case, there is no reason to 
expect that  supply constraints would affect the mix of patients. However, if 
nursing homes ration their beds in order to maximize profits, it is likely that 
poorer and sicker individuals will have their access to nursing home beds re- 
duced more severely than will other individuals. 
To examine this issue in more detail, we distinguish people along two di- 
State Policies and Nursing Home Composition 
29. The coefficient on an indicator for senility is ,517 (.137). 
30. Without policy controls, the coefficient on days of snow was ,0083 (.0024).  With the bed 
supply included. the coefficient on snow days declined to ,0047 (.0031). 418  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
mensions:  financial  status  (income below  $5,000 or above  $lO,OOO)"  and 
health status (more than two ADLs).~*  We then interact these variables with 
the state policies. Our equation is of the form 
-  log(p:""")  = X, * f3  + yz  X  UNDPAY,  + (7, + 6, 
(2)  X LOWINC, + 6,  X HIGHINC, + 6,  X HIGHADLJ 
X MEDNEED, + E,. 
Interaction terms (the coefficients 6) which are not statistically distinguishable 
from zero would indicate that the policies have uniform effects on the elderly. 
Conversely, interaction terms that are different from zero indicate that some 
groups are more affected by state policies than others, and that the composition 
of nursing home users varies with changes in state policies. 
Table 11.8 shows the estimates of these interaction equations. We begin with 
the equation in column (5)  of table 11.7, although without the home care meas- 
ure. The first column of table 11.8 examines the interactions with the medically 
needy policy variable. The upper panel of the table reports the coefficients on 
the interaction terms 6,.  The second panel reports the coefficients on the state 
policy variables ya.  The other independent variables are included in the equa- 
tion but are omitted from the table for convenience. 
The last panel reports the change in the probability of nursing home use for 
five typical  people. The first three vary by  income:  low income ($4,000 in 
family income), middle income ($8,000 in family income), and high income 
($12,000 in family income). The last two differ in the number of  ADLs: low 
ADLs (one ADL) and high ADLs (three ADLs).,~  The entry in each row is the 
change in the probability of  nursing home use for that group resulting from the 
addition of a medically needy program. 
Being in a state with a medically needy program increases the likelihood of 
nursing home utilization for middle- and high-income individuals, but not for 
low-income individuals. The estimates suggest that medically needy programs 
increase the probability of nursing home use by  over 2 percentage points for 
middle- and upper-income individuals, but reduce it only slightly, by 0.21 per- 
centage points,  for  low-income  individuals.  Clearly,  there  is an  aggregate 
expansion in nursing home beds in states with a medically needy program. 
The coefficient on the interaction between the medically needy variable with 
the disability dummy variable is positive and large, but insignificantly different 
from zero. The increased probability of nursing home use due to the medically 
needy program is 2.1 percentage points for individuals with fewer than 2 disa- 
bilities, but 5.5 percentage points for those with more ADLs. This potentially 
31. In  1982, the poverty rate was $4,626 for single elderly  and $5,836 for couples. The low- 
income indicator is thus close to a measure of poverty among the elderly. 
32. We experimented with a variety of  other measures as well, including the other financial and 
health status measures. The results with these two variables were the most consistent of the equa- 
tions. 
33. In each case, we keep the other characteristics the same as in table 11.7. 419  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
Table 11.8  Interactions of State Policies in Nursing Home Use-Dependent 
Variable: Use of Nursing Home, 1982-84 
Equation 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Interaction terms 
Income < $5,000 
Income 2 $10,000 
ADLs > 2 
Medicaid underpayment 
Income < $5,000 






Income 2  $lO,oOO  - 
ADLs > 2  - 
State policy 
Medically needy  ,203 
(.134) 
(.014) 
Change in probability of use (percentage points) 
Medically needy 
Low income  -.21 
Middle income  2.25 
High income  3.15 
Low ADLs  2.13 
Medicaid underpayment  -.039** 
High ADLs  5.49 
Medicaid underpayment 
Low income  - 




Individual controls  Yes 
Number of observations  4,374 








































-  2.47 
-1.39 
-  1.03 
-  1.32 
-  1.49 
Yes 
4,374 
-  1,629 
Nore: The table reports logit equations for nursing home use. Each column interacts the state 
policies with income and the number of ADLs. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 10 percent level. 
**Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 5 percent level. 420  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
suggests that medically  needy programs offer a greater subsidy to the more 
disabled relative to the less disabled. 
Column  (2) of  table  11.8 examines the interactions  of  income and ADLs 
with the Medicaid  underpayment variable. In states with a greater Medicaid 
underpayment, the poor suffer much larger decreases in access than do middle- 
or high-income individuals. The effect is large and statistically significant. A 
one standard deviation increase in Medicaid underpayment results in a 2.5 per- 
centage decline in nursing home utilization for those with low incomes, a  I .6 
decline for those with middle incomes, and a  1 percentage  point decline for 
high-income  individuals. This is consistent  with the hypothesis  that nursing 
homes discriminate in filling their beds. On the other hand, we find no evidence 
of discrimination against individuals with more disabilities. The impact of the 
Medicaid underpayment variable is essentially independent of health status. 
Column (3) of table  11.8 includes the interactions with both state policies. 
These equations need to be interpreted with some caution because of the high 
correlation between the different interaction terms. The standard errors in col- 
umn (3) are much larger than in the previous two columns. Including the medi- 
cally needy interactions does little to the coefficients on the Medicaid under- 
payment interactions. The estimates still suggest large discrepancies between 
the utilization of nursing homes by the poor and by those with higher incomes. 
In contrast, the interactions between the medically  needy variable and in- 
come become smaller. In column (3), both high- and low-income people ap- 
pear to utilize nursing homes more in the presence of a medically needy pro- 
gram.  Evidently,  some  of  the  explanatory  power  of  the  medically  needy 
variable  in column  (1) comes from its correlation  with the Medicaid under- 
payment. There is still evidence that people with more ADLs are more likely 
to be admitted to a nursing home in states with a medically  needy program. 
The estimates suggest a differential of about 3 percentage points, although this 
result is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
11.6  What is the Marginal Source of Community Care? 
Because the elderly live either in nursing homes or in the community, it is 
clear  that  when  nursing  home  utilization  increases,  community living  de- 
creases. In this section, we try to determine whether one form of community 
living is more responsive to state policies than others. The substitution of dif- 
ferent types of community care for nursing home care is fundamental to con- 
cerns  about moral hazard  in  nursing  home  provision.  If  nursing  homes  are 
viewed by  the elderly or their children as a last resort, then improving access 
to nursing homes  might reduce the number  of  elderly who are living alone 
without  other sources of  care. On the other hand,  if  nursing homes  are not 
viewed in this dire light, then improving access might lead many elderly who 
currently receive informal help from family and friends to seek nursing home 
care. This could result in either an extremely expensive program or, if nursing 421  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
home supply is severely restricted, long queues and potentially inefficient nurs- 
ing home rationing. 
11.6.1 
The upper panel of  table 11.9 shows living arrangements of the elderly in 
1984. We divide living arrangements into three types: living in a nursing home 
(9.0 percent), living alone or with a spouse only, which we term receiving no 
help (62.7 percent),  and living with children or others (28.2  The 
last category predominantly involves children (about two-thirds of the cases), 
with the remainder  involving  siblings, “other relatives,”  and  “other nonrela- 
tives.”jS The fact that nursing home use is so low, even among the disabled 
elderly, is the source of much of the moral hazard concern. Even policies that 
lower the share of people in the community by  a small amount will increase 
aggregate institutionalization  rates  substantially.  On the other hand, the fact 
that almost two-thirds of the elderly live alone or with a spouse only has led 
some to suggest that adequate long-term care is lacking for many of the elderly. 
There are two ways for community living to respond to state policies. The 
first is the “mathematical” response that must occur when nursing home use 
responds  to state variables-as  more people live in a nursing  home, fewer 
people will live in the community. The community response may be greater 
than this response, however, if people in the community change their behavior 
in anticipation of future nursing home access. For instance, in states with large 
bed supplies, children may not bother to have their parents move in with them 
when the parents begin to need help, anticipating than when severe disability 
occurs, the parents will enter a nursing home. Similarly, children anticipating 
difficulty in procuring nursing home access for their parents may react to the 
onset of disability by making alternative arrangements right away. In this case, 
increases in nursing home access would lead to increased probabilities of  liv- 
ing alone, rather than reductions in this probability. 
To examine the substitution of nursing home and community living arrange- 
ments, we estimate equations for the probability of the elderly being in each 
living arrangement. We model living status as a multinomial choice, a natural 
extension of our earlier logit models for nursing home use. Letting p:”  be 
the probability of  living without help and pffd  be the probability of living with 
children or others, we assume that: 
Community Living Responses to State Policies 
34. These living arrangements need not be mutually exclusive. Some individuals will live both 
with a spouse and with children, for example. To facilitate the empirical work, however, we have 
defined people who live with any other people to be in the third category. The results are similar 
if  we use broader definitions of  the living arrangements and estimate logit models for each type 
of living arrangement separately. 
35. We have experimented with separating children from the other groups and found similar 
results. We  group them together here both because the amount of  nonchild living arrangements 
are relatively small and because we suspect errors in some of the records (e.g..  some people report 
living with grandchildren but do not mention living with children). 422  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
Table 11.9  Measures of Living Status and Help Received 
Measure  Number  Percent 
Living Status in 1984 
In nursing home  414  9.0% 
No help  2882  62.7% 
With children or others  I298  28.2% 
Total  4596  100% 
Use of Helpers in 1984 
Some paid help  1043  22.7% 
Some help from children  1799  39.1  % 
Substantial paid help  404  8.8% 
Substantial help from children  963  21.0% 
Total  4596  100% 
Correlation of  Paid Help and Help From Children 
Some Help From 
Children 
Some Paid Help  No  Yes 
No  60%  40% 
[76%]  [79%] 
Yes  63%  37% 
[24%]  [21%] 
Nore: The table shows the living status of  the elderly and use of  helpers in  1984. In the last panel, 
the first number in each cell is the percentage of  people in  that row who are in that column. The 
second number (in brackets) is the percentage of people in each column who are in that row. 
log(p:h) -  log(p:"h"p)  = X, X  pnh  + yYh  X MEDNEED, + rib 
(3)  X  UNDPAY, + E:~, 
log(py) -  log(p:"  ) = x, x  pk'd + yy 
X  MEDNEED, + yiid  X  UNDPAY, + ~f'd. 
We use the same set of  individual characteristics  as in the earlier equations, 
except we omit the measure of home ownership, since this is likely to be en- 
dogenous to the chosen living arrangement.3h Presumably, individual demo- 
graphic, financial, and health status are less influenced by living status than is 
the home ownership decision. All of the variables in the regression are mea- 
sured as of 1982. 
Table 11.10 presents estimates of the determinants of  living arrangements, 
including all three policy variables. The coefficients on the individual charac- 
36. Since our sample is of people alive in  1984, we omit the indicator for death over the two 
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Table 11.10  Living Status of Elderly-Dependent  Variables: Living Status in 
1984 (probability relative to no help) 
Entire Sample  Nonmarried Sample 
Nursing  Children  Nursing  Children 
Home  or Other  p-Value  Home  or Other  p-Value 





















Number of ADLs 




,070  ,029 
(.134)  (.087) 
-.017  .018* 
(.015)  (.010) 
-  ,043  .206** 
(.164)  (.103) 
.537**  -.204 
(.267)  (.130) 
.853**  -.051 
(.261)  (.131) 
1.134**  -.091 
(.260)  (.139) 
1.657**  .526** 
(.264)  (.144) 
.524**  -.790** 
(.251)  (.116) 
-.149**  .164** 
(.039)  (.023) 
.776**  1.405** 
(.179)  (.117) 
-.027  -.023** 
(.017)  (.011) 
.017  -.027 
(.032)  (.029) 
.065  -.044 
(.073)  (.052) 
1.329**  ,027 
(.426)  (.148) 
.205**  .139** 
(.033)  (.023) 
,141  ,105 
(.098)  (.094) 
.576**  ,190 
(.230)  (.181) 
,055  -.296 
(.350)  (.305) 
,769  ,020  -.020  r.7991 
(.153)  (.103) 
,029  -.021  .020*  [.018] 
(.017)  (.012) 
,225  ,206 
(.197)  (.132) 
.693**  ,019 
(.326)  (.166) 
.751**  ,071 
(.319)  (.162) 
1.067**  ,080 
(.312)  (.166) 
1.538**  .627** 
(.310)  (.169) 
.545**  -.739** 
(.278)  (.135) 
-.163**  .116* 
(.OM)  (.027) 
-  - 
-.044**  -.040** 
(.021)  (.015) 
.075*  -.017 
(.043)  (.040) 
,114  -.012 
(.093)  (.065) 
1.404**  .347* 
(.471)  (.185) 
.241**  .186** 
(.040)  (.028) 
. I04  ,087 
(.098)  (.094) 
.567**  ,204 
(.284)  (.225) 
-.I37  -.335 
(.408)  (.333) 
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Table 11.10  (continued) 
Change in Probability  (percentage points) 
Entire Sample  Nonmarried Sample 
Nursing  Children  Nursing  Children 
Home  No Help  or Other  Home  No Help  or Other 
Medically needy  .48  -  .70  .22  .28  23  -  .5 1 
Medicaid  -.59  -  .27  ,86  -1.31  -1.12  2.44 
underpayment 
Number of  3,477  2,112 
observations 
Log likelihood  -2.610  -  1,880 
Note: The table reports  logit equations for the probability of  different living arrangements as a 
function of demographics, financial and health status, and state policy variables. No help is defined 
as living with a spouse only or living alone. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 10 percent level. 
**Indicates that variable is statistically  different from zero at 5 percent level. 
teristics indicate that older and sicker people are relatively more likely to live 
in nursing homes than without help. There is some evidence (but less uniform) 
that these people are also more likely to live with their children or others as 
well. Having more  children  significantly increases  the probability  of  living 
with them and decreases the probability of  living in a nursing home. 
Unmarried people are substantially more likely to live in a nursing home or 
with others than are married people. This contrasts with table 11.7, where there 
was no increase in the probability of any nursing home use for these people. 
The primary difference between  the measure  of nursing home use here and 
that in table  11.7 is that the “any use” measure in table  11.7 includes many 
more shorter-duration stays than the point-in-time measure in table  11.10. At 
a single point in time, many more people in a nursing home will have been in 
for a long time, even if the share of stays which are of short duration is large. 
Apparently,  unmarried  people are  much  more  likely  to  have  long-duration 
rather than short-duration nursing home stays. Higher-income people are sig- 
nificantly less likely to live with children or others, perhaps because they are 
more likely to have paid help, or because their children are less likely to invite 
them in, given that they can afford paid help. 
The first row of table 11.10 examines the effects on living status of being in 
a medically needy state. Unlike the findings in table  11.7, the elderly are no 
more  likely  to  live  in  a  nursing  home  in  a  medically  needy  state  than  in 
a non-medically  needy state. As noted above, this measure of  nursing home 
use is weighted toward longer durations than the “any use” variable used in 
table 11.7. 
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variable is that the medically needy program increases demand more for short 
nursing  home stays than  for long  nursing  home  stays.  In  medically  needy 
states, individuals need only spend current income on nursing home care (as- 
suming they meet the asset test). In non-medically  needy states, however, if a 
person’s income is too high for Medicaid  but  lower than  the nursing  home 
price, they must sell their assets (such as their house) in order to afford nursing 
home care. People who anticipate  returning  to the  community after a short 
nursing home stay may be less willing to do this than people anticipating living 
in the nursing home until they die. Alternatively, because there are fewer indi- 
viduals in a nursing home in 1984 than individuals who used a nursing home 
between 1982  and 1984, it may be harder to pick up the effects of the medically 
needy program. 
The second row of  table  11.10 reports the effects of the Medicaid under- 
payment  on  living  status.  As  in  table  11.7, the  lower the Medicaid  under- 
payment, the more likely is living in a nursing home. The coefficient on living 
in a nursing home is not significantly different from the probability of receiv- 
ing no help but  is significantly different from the probability  of no help or 
living with children. In addition, the lower the underpayment, the greater the 
probability of  living with one’s children. Reducing the underpayment by one 
standard deviation raises the probability  of living in a nursing home by  0.6 
percentage points, lowers the probability of living with children by 0.9 percent- 
age points, and actually raises the probability  of living without  help by  0.3 
percentage points. Evidently, there is some additional change in living status 
away  from children  and  toward  living  alone in  states with  smaller  under- 
payment amounts. 
Columns (3) and (4) of  table 11.10 repeat these regressions for a sample of 
nonmanied elderly. The results are quite similar, and the effect of the Medicaid 
underpayment is even stronger. Lowering the Medicaid underpayment by one 
standard deviation raises the probability of  living in a nursing home by  1.3 
percentage points, lowers the probability of living with children by 2.4 percent- 
age points, and raises the probability of living with no help by  1.1 percentage 
points. Thus, there is some evidence that increasing access to nursing homes 
by  reducing  the Medicaid  underpayment  amount would  not only encourage 
individuals to live in nursing homes rather than with their children, but would 
also encourage individuals to live alone rather than with their children. 
The finding  that  individuals  living  in  states  with  low  Medicaid  under- 
payments are less likely to live with their children is consistent with the moral 
hazard interpretation.  However, the result may also be due to differences in 
underlying health status. Because the people living with their children may be 
sicker or more disabled than those living alone, they may be more likely to 
demand nursing home care when access is increased. Because we include so 
many health  status variables in the regression, this interpretation  seems un- 
likely to be correct. 
A second question about these results concerns the interpretation of the co- 426  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
efficient on  living with children. Because we are looking at net flows rather 
than gross flows, we may miss some response to state policies. For example, if 
reducing the Medicaid underpayment caused individuals living alone to move 
into the nursing home, but also caused individuals living with their children to 
live alone, one would observe an increased probability of  nursing home use, 
a reduced probability of living with children, and possibly no change in the 
probability of  living alone. Unfortunately, we have no way  to sort out gross 
and net flows with our data. 
As with the earlier equations, it is important to consider the interactions of 
the state policies with personal characteristics, to evaluate the effects of these 
factors on people with different incomes and health statuses. Table 11.11 pre- 
sents the results of these interactions, and table 11.12 reports point estimates 
of the change in living arrangements for five typical individuals, using the re- 
sults from equation (3) in table 11.11. 
The coefficients on the medically needy variable are difficult to interpret. 
The estimates suggest that the poor are more likely to live with their children 
than are the middle- or high-income elderly. This might be consistent with the 
hypothesis that the poor’s access to nursing home care is reduced in medically 
needy states, except that the poor are also more likely to be in a nursing home. 
Similarly, while the rich are more likely to be in nursing homes in medically 
needy  states, they  are no less likely to live with their children.  Finally, the 
interaction between  the medically  needy  variable and the number  of  ADLs 
indicates that, in medically needy states, it is harder for the sick to gain access 
to nursing homes. This is opposite to the result in table 11.8. 
The interactions with Medicaid underpayment are more consistent with the 
earlier results. In states with high underpayments, the poor’s access to nursing 
homes is limited more than is the access of middle- and high-income individu- 
als. As before, the marginal source of  care appears to be children. When Med- 
icaid underpayment increases by one standard deviation, the probability of liv- 
ing with children increases 1.4 percentage points for the poor, 0.6 percentage 
points for the middle-income  group, and 0.3 percentage  points for the high- 
income group. This finding is consistent with nursing homes discriminating 
against poorer individuals when underpayments are higher. As in the previous 
equations, we  find no evidence  of  an  interaction  between  Medicaid  under- 
payment and ADLs. 
11.6.2  Helper Response to State Policies 
Living with one’s children or others is not the only way of receiving commu- 
nity care. As shown in table 11.9, many of the elderly living in the community 
have helpers for at least some tasks (22.7 percent), and even more receive some 
help from their children (39.1 per~ent).~’  The NLTCS also asks questions about 
37. People living  in nursing  homes are defined  as receiving no paid  help and  no help from 
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Table 11.11  Interaction of State Policies in Living Status Equations-Dependent 
Variable: Living Status in 1984 
Equation 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Nursing  Children  Nursing  Children  Nursing  Children 
Independent Variable  Home  or Others  Home  or Others  Home  or Others 
Interaction terms 
Medically needy 
Income < $5,000 
Income 2  $lO,oOO 
ADLs > 2 
Medicaid Underpayment 
Income < $5,000 
Income 2 $10,000 






























-.003  .028** 
(.015)  (.010) 
,002  -.001 
(.021)  (.014) 
-.004  ,017 
(.022)  (.015) 
,068  ,062 
(.I351  (.088) 
-.014  ,003 




,436  .358** 
(.275)  (.184) 
,315  ,135 
(.367)  (46) 
-.357  .LO1 
(.265)  (.186) 
-.025  ,011 
(.021)  (.013) 
-.016  -.009 
(.029)  (.019) 
,012  ,013 
(.025)  (.017) 
-.026  -.I57 
(.235)  (.151) 
(.020)  (.013) 





*Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 10 percent level. 
**Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 5 percent level. 
how many days of  help each source provided in the week preceding the survey. 
We define substantial help as help of three days or more in the previous week. 
Almost 9 percent of  people receive substantial paid help, and 21  percent re- 
ceive substantial help from children. 
While many people living with their children receive substantial help from 
them (70 percent), this is not always the case. Further, some people living alone 
or with a spouse receive substantial help from their children (6 percent). The 
measure of help from children is thus an independent measure of the provision 
of  informal community care. 
The bottom panel of table 11.9 presents the correlations between paid help 
and help from children. The two forms of community care do not appear to be 
substitutes. For example, 37 percent of those receiving paid help also receive 
help from children. In contrast, 40 percent of  those not receiving  paid help 428  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
Table 11.12  Interactions of State Policies in Living Status-Dependent  Variable: 
Living Status in 1984 
Nursing Home  No Help  Children or Others 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Change in probabilip (percentage  points) 
Medically needy 
Low income  2.94 
Middle income  -  .07 
High income  I .96 
Low ADLs  -  .07 







-  .91 
-  .26 





-  1.57 
1.33 
3.27 




-  1.42 
1.78 
-  1.35 
-.38 







Note: The table reports the predicted change in living status from a one standard deviation increase 
in bed supply or underpayment rates, or adding a medically needy program, on the probability of 
any nursing home use. The estimates are based on equation (3) of table  I  I.  11. 
receive help from children. Similarly, those elderly receiving help from chil- 
dren are no less likely to receive paid help than those not receiving help from 
children. 
To examine the responsiveness  of the probabilities  of receiving paid  help 
and help from children to state policies, we estimate logit model for each type 
of  help. We  estimate the equations separately  since there is no natural  link 
between the different measures of help. Table 1  1.13 presents the results. 
Generally the elderly who receive help have the same characteristics as those 
who are likely to be in nursing homes. Older and sicker people have substan- 
tially increased probabilities of receiving both types of help. Having more chil- 
dren is associated with a lower probability of receiving paid help, but a higher 
probability of receiving help from children. Higher-income  people are more 
likely to use paid help, but less likely to receive help from their children.38 
Again, we find that children are the marginal source of community care. We 
find no significant effect of  state policies on the use of  paid  help, but large 
effects on the probability of receiving substantial help from children. In states 
with  medically  needy  programs,  the  elderly  are 0.9 percentage  points  less 
likely to receive any help from their children and 2.1 percentage  points less 
likely to receive substantial help. Similarly, increasing  the Medicaid  under- 
payment amount by one standard deviation is associated with a 0.5 percentage 
point increase in the probability of receiving any help from children and a 2.1 
percentage point increase in the probability of receiving substantial help. 
38. This finding contradicts the finding in Bemheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) that children 
of rich parents are more attentive to them. 429  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
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Change in probability (percentage points) 
Medically needy  1.01 
Medically underpayment  -  .48 
Number of observations  3,417 
Log likelihood  -  1,736 
Substantial  Any  Substantial 
(2)  (3)  (41 










































































-  ,434 
(.281) 
-.85 






















-  .023* 
(.014) 
-  ,022 
(.036) 
-.185 















-  1,447 
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Table 11.13  (continued) 
Nore: The table reports logit equations for the probability of  use of helpers as a function of demo- 
graphics, financial and health status, and state policy variables. Substantial use is defined as utiliza- 
tion of more than three days in the preceding week. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 10  percent level. 
**Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 5 percent level. 
To test the effects of state policies on different types of  people, we again 
interact the state policies with income and the number of ADLs. We consider 
only the equations for substantial help from children, since the largest effects 
are found for this measure. The results are presented in table 11.14. 
Being in a medically needy state reduces the probability of receiving help 
from children for all the elderly. The lowest income group is the least affected, 
however, and the high-income  group is the most affected. This is consistent 
with the  interpretation  that the demand for nursing  home  care  is increased 
more for the higher-income groups than for the lower-income groups. We also 
find that children’s help is reduced relatively more for those with fewer disabili- 
ties, although this effect is not statistically significant. 
The Medicaid underpayment amount has the expected effects on the differ- 
ent elderly groups. Increasing the Medicaid underpayment barely affects the 
amount of  help high-income people receive, but has large effects on amount 
of help lower- and middle-income individuals receive. Once again, this is con- 
sistent with  a story of discrimination  against low-income  individuals.  Simi- 
larly, the point estimates suggest some discrimination against those with many 
ADLs, although the effect is small and statistically insignificant. 
Column (3) of table 11.14 includes all the interactions. The coefficients are 
similar to the regression when the interactions are included individually. The 
estimates suggest large differences by age, with the medically needy variable 
substantially affecting care provided by  children of high-income  elderly and 
the  Medicaid  underpayment  amount affecting  care  provided  by  children  of 
low-income elderly. The results in table 11.14 thus strongly confirm the moral 
hazard interpretation of the aggregate results. 
11.7  Conclusions 
Government policies have a substantial effect on the utilization of nursing 
homes by  the elderly. Policies such as the ability to spend down income and 
receive government support and the relative payment levels of Medicaid pro- 
grams affect both the overall rate of nursing home utilization and the distribu- 
tion of elderly who are institutionalized. In states with more liberal spenddown 
rules, the richer elderly are more likely to utilize a nursing home than are the 
poorer elderly. Similarly, in states with larger price differentials,  the poor el- 
derly receive substantially less nursing home utilization. 431  Policy Options for Long-Term Care 
Table 11.14  Interaction of State Policies in Substantial Help from Children- 
Dependent Variable: Substantial Help from Children in 1984 
Equation 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Interaction terms 
Medically needy 
Income < $5,000  ,099 
(.147) 
Income 2 Sl0,OOO  -.382* 
(.233) 
ADLs > 2  ,235 
(.178) 
Medicaid underpayment 
Income < $5,000  - 
Income z $10,000  - 
ADLs > 2  - 
State policv 
Medically needy  -.340** 
(.136) 
(.011) 
Medicaid underpayment  .042** 
Change in probabilir): (percentage  points) 
Medically needy 
Low income  -2.03 
Middle income  -2.66 
High income  -4.71 
Low ADLs  -2.48 







Individual Controls  Yes 
Number of Observations  3,477 
Log Likelihood  -  1,444 
,009 
(.011) 















-  1,445 
,064 
(.202) 


























-  1,444 
Note: The table reports coefficients from interaction terms in logit equations for substantial help 
from children. The sample is elderly alive in  1984. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 10 percent level. 
**Indicates that variable is statistically different from zero at 5 percent level. 432  David M. Cutler and Louise M. Sheiner 
The marginal source of  community care for people in a nursing home ap- 
pears to be care from children  and others. Estimates suggest that  all of the 
elderly admitted to nursing homes when policies change formerly lived with 
their children or with others. In addition, changes in state policies affect the 
share of elderly who receive substantial help from their children on a regular 
basis. The view that the marginal nursing home admission is an elderly person 
living alone and without other means of  support does not appear true in our 
data. Rather, the fact that moral hazard in nursing home admissions appears to 
be pervasive  suggests that governments are justified  in  only cautiously  ex- 
panding the set of people eligible for public funding of nursing home care. 
These results are particularly important because the distribution of  the el- 
derly population  is likely to change substantially over the next half century. 
Between 1990 and 2020, the percentage of women aged 85 and over without 
any living children is projected to fall from 22 percent to 10 percent (Wolfe et 
al.  1991; Advisory Council on Social Security  1991). A  number of  people 
have suggested that the coming decrease in childless elderly will substantially 
reduce demand for nursing home care (Rivlin and Weiner 1988). Indeed, the 
results presented earlier indicate that people with more children are substan- 
tially less likely to use a nursing home than those with fewer children. As the 
number of childless elderly falls, however, the moral hazard risk will increase. 
To the extent that nursing homes are substitutes for care from children, a reduc- 
tion in the share of childless elderly reduces the “deserving” elderly population 
relative to the total population. In future years, subsidies to nursing home care 
may have more of an effect on care provided by children, and less of an effect 
on the childless elderly. 
Indeed, these results suggest  exploring  policies targeted only to the childless 
elderly, rather than to the entire elderly community. For the childless group, 
nursing home demand is high and the loss from moral hazard is low. It is inter- 
esting, in this light, that the German system of long-term care explicitly counts 
income of children as resources to be spent on the elderly. The results here 
suggest greater exploration  of  this type of program in the United  States, as 
well. 
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Comment on Chapters 10 and 11  Jonathan Feinstein 
The papers by  David Cutler and Louise Sheiner and by Andrew Dick, Alan 
Garber, and Thomas MaCurdy examine several different aspects of long-term 
care. The two papers address interesting and related issues, but they do so in 
very different ways, reflecting the different styles of  the authors. Since both 
papers are concerned with policy-relevant issues, it is useful, in evaluating the 
contributions  of each paper, to keep in mind the broad socioeconomic facts 
and policy alternatives which frame the current debate about long-term care in 
the United States. In what follows I first very briefly describe this larger con- 
text. I then discuss each paper in greater detail. Finally, I conclude my discus- 
sion by returning to the broader context, suggesting some general orientations 
which may help guide future research in this area. 
Jonathan Feinstein is associate professor of economics at the Yale School of Organization and 
Management and a research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 435  Comment on Chapters  10 and  1 1 
Overview of the Socioeconomic Context 
As is described in some detail in earlier papers in this volume, the United 
States is faced with an aging population:  there are increasing numbers of el- 
derly, and the life expectancy of each elderly person is steadily increasing, in 
recent decades at the rate of nearly two years every decade.' As life expectancy 
increases among the elderly, we can expect that the number of  years a typical 
elderly person spends while afflicted with significant impairments of daily liv- 
ing will at least remain  constant, and may well  increase.  In  addition, many 
elderly experience and can be expected to continue to experience periods of 
limitation interspersed  with periods of relative health, a life pattern which is 
of especial concern to Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy in their paper. As has also 
been well documented by earlier papers at this conference, the elderly are also 
consuming an increasing share of national expenditures, especially because of 
increases in their health-care costs. 
In considering appropriate policy responses to these statistics, three issues 
strike me as especially salient. First, we must consider options for long-term 
care as part of the larger set of issues concerning elderly living arrangements. 
Though long-term care is most commonly pictured as arising within a life his- 
tory in which an elderly person lives in his or her own home and moves to a 
nursing home when significantly impaired, in fact the actual pattern of mobil- 
ity is often more complex than this, encompassing movements in and out of 
hospitals, the provision of at-home care by family members, paid at-home care, 
retirement communities, and life care facilities. Any policy which affects any 
one of these living and health-care options implicitly affects the others as well. 
Second, many issues of long-term care involve other family members. On 
the one hand, family members may be the main alternative source of care to 
nursing home care or residence in a life care facility. On the other hand, of that 
portion of  long-term care expenditures which are financed out-of-pocket, most 
are implicitly being taken from a later bequest. Hence the incentives, abilities, 
and  opportunity  costs-of-time of  family members are important  aspects of 
many long-term care debates. 
Third, much more attention needs to be paid to political economy arguments 
in assessing current long-term care configurations and the usefulness of pro- 
posed  policies.  Well-entrenched  nursing  home, hospital,  and other interest 
groups can exert a powerful impact on policies and outcomes. I return to each 
of these points several times in the subsequent discussion, and in my conclud- 
ing comments. 
Detailed Discussion of Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy 
The paper by Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy  specifies a careful econometric 
model of transitions into and out of nursing homes, estimates the model, and 
1, As Jim Vaupel and Burt Singer have emphasized in some of these earlier papers, great uncer- 
tainty attaches to the actual increase in the dependency ratio and life expectancy over the next 100 
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uses the estimates to simulate the distribution of cumulative nursing home uti- 
lization. In discussing the paper, I will first argue that the results may be of 
broader usefulness than the authors appear to realize and will then review the 
paper’s methodology and results, suggesting some possible weaknesses. 
In their paper, Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy  argue that the distribution (not 
just the mean or per capita level) of individual cumulative nursing home utili- 
zation over the life span contains important information for policy. They also 
point out that, if  appropriate data were available, calculating this distribution 
would  be  relatively  straightforward.  Perhaps  the  best  data  for this  exercise 
would be the complete set of nursing home records on each of a random sam- 
ple of  deceased individuals. Unfortunately,  such data is not  available. As an 
alternative, the authors adopt an indirect approach, combining data from the 
National Nursing Home Survey and the National Long-Term Care Survey to 
estimate a complete Markov transition model of entry into and out of nursing 
homes over the life span, and then using their estimates to reconstruct an esti- 
mate of the cumulative distribution of nursing home utilization. This is a clever 
approach and yields some very useful estimates and projections. 
The authors present their model as being almost entirely motivated by  the 
desire to recover the distribution of cumulative utilization. While I agree that 
this distribution is important for policy, it is worth asking whether the more 
detailed estimates of this paper, including the estimates of transitions in and 
out of nursing homes, of the durations of first and subsequent nursing home 
spells and first and subsequent (what they call return) community spells, and of 
exit probabilities, have independent interest. It seems to me that these various 
estimates do have interest, for at least three reasons. First, the elderly experi- 
ence significant  mobility  costs. As a ballpark  figure,  about  one-half  of  all 
moves by the elderly result in serious physical or psychological deterioration, 
involving disorientation and loss of attachment. Such costs arise not only when 
the elderly move to a nursing home, but also in a move from a nursing facility 
to a home or hospital,  and in most other kinds of  moves.  Since each move 
has a cost, the overall welfare of an elderly person who experiences  a given 
cumulative amount of nursing home care will differ depending on whether that 
care arose  in one long stay or two  or more  shorter  stays. Thus  if  policy  is 
designed around considerations of welfare, the pattern of moves is relevant. 
Second, the kinds of living arrangements which are appropriate for the el- 
derly upon discharge from a nursing home depend in part on how  long the 
elderly can be expected to stay in the community before either dying or moving 
back to a nursing home. Again, the Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy estimates can 
provide evidence on this issue. 
Finally, should a viable long-term care insurance market emerge, the con- 
tracts sold in this market could conceivably be structured so as to change rates 
or renegotiate the terms of  insurance following a first nursing home stay, in a 
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accident.  If  such contracts  were  written,  information  about  multiple  spells 
would be important for calibrating insurance rates and evaluating the welfare 
consequences of a given insurance package. 
Although the Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy estimates are of considerable in- 
terest, it seems to me that the most interesting part of  these estimates is also 
the most difficult to estimate with the data they use. Their estimates of nursing 
home spell durations  and exit probabilities  are only of  mild interest: for the 
most part these estimates simply confirm the findings of earlier work, including 
the raw data tables in the National Nursing Home Survey compendium itself. 
In  contrast, their estimates  of  the duration  and outcome of  first community 
spells is somewhat new, and their estimates of  the duration and outcome of 
return community spells is to my knowledge  the first of its kind. However, 
these latter two sets of estimates are more problematic than the former. 
Regarding initial community spells, note the following. Most of these spells 
are  quite  long.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  data  which  Dick,  Garber,  and 
MaCurdy use to estimate  these spells cover only a 28-month window (from 
1982 to 1984), which is why the majority of these spells which are ongoing as 
of  1982 are still ongoing (and thus censored) as of  1984. As a result, to get an 
adequate estimate of the duration of first community spells, the authors must 
rely extensively on retrospective data, which is inherently less reliable. Further, 
since retrospective data is being relied on more for the longer spells than the 
shorter, one must worry about possible biases creeping into the estimate of the 
duration distribution. 
Return community spells are typically short, and therefore censoring is less 
of a problem in estimating a duration distribution  for these. However, there 
are fewer than 500 return spells recorded  in the data; while this quantity  is 
undoubtedly enough to estimate exit probabilities and crude duration probabil- 
ities, it is probably not enough to precisely estimate a detailed duration distri- 
bution, particularly once covariates are taken account of. 
I will mention two further issues related to the Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy 
results. First, because data on hospitalizations is not recorded in the data being 
used, the empirical  results do not  incorporate  hospitalization  spells into the 
analysis; this is unfortunate,  since many  transitions  into and out of  nursing 
homes come from hospitals, particularly those which end in death. If hospital- 
ization data were available over the 1982-84  time period, it could presumably 
be folded into the analysis. 
Second, the authors use a flexible spline procedure  to control for duration 
dependence and some covariates. This is a nice procedure, well explained in 
the paper and presumably quite flexible. However, one thing the authors do not 
do is  provide  a  tight  characterization  of  the  statistical  properties  of  these 
splines. In particular, they do not provide any sensitivity analysis which might 
indicate why they chose the number of spline terms they did, and they do not 
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toward a more fully nonparametric analysis (that is, they do not show that the 
collection  of  splines they  are using could  in the limit generate  a legitimate 
nonparametric analysis). 
Toward the end of the Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy paper, useful simulations 
are presented which summarize the findings of the paper for predicting cumu- 
lative nursing home utilization. I believe even more could be done here. For 
example, the authors could shed interesting light on the “end of life” contro- 
versy, by  computing what proportion  of total utilization  happens in the last 
year or two of life. They might also be able to say something about how mor- 
bidity may be expected to change in response to an increase in life expectancy. 
Overall, this is a useful, interesting, and well-executed paper. 
Detailed Discussion of Cutler and Sheiner 
The paper by Cutler and Sheiner is stylistically opposite to the work of Dick, 
Garber, and MaCurdy. Where Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy focus on one spe- 
cific issue, Cutler and Sheiner explore a wide range of  topics, often in novel 
and interesting ways. While Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy devote a good deal of 
attention to econometric modeling, Cutler and Sheiner fit rather simple models 
and instead emphasize institutional detail. In my discussion of  the Cutler and 
Sheiner work, I will first voice some reservations about certain of their prem- 
ises. Then I will discuss their results, suggesting that these are highly sugges- 
tive and potentially  quite valuable, but not  fully convincing as currently de- 
veloped. 
In the beginning of their paper, Cutler and Sheiner argue that moral hazard 
is an important issue in nursing home entry and policy  development. I find 
their argument about moral hazard somewhat implausible; accordingly, I will 
briefly criticize their discussion and suggest some alternative considerations. 
Cutler  and  Sheiner seem to be  suggesting  that  elderly  individuals  may 
choose to enter a nursing home unnecessarily  whenever financial (and life- 
style) considerations make this an attractive option; based on this view, Cutler 
and Sheiner argue throughout the paper that financial reimbursement for nurs- 
ing home care is susceptible to abuse and must be carefully monitored. 
In fact, there is not much direct evidence that the elderly themselves unnec- 
essarily enter nursing homes (I consider the evidence in this paper largely indi- 
rect; see below). On the contrary, there are several pieces of evidence which 
indicate that the elderly do not and should not desire to enter a nursing home 
except when absolutely necessary. First, as I mentioned in the context of the 
Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy paper, the elderly experience high mobility costs 
and will rarely move if they can avoid it. Second, recent work has revealed that 
nursing homes are rather undesirable places to be. For example, a number of 
recent articles have publicized the fact that anywhere from 20 to 50 percent of 
all nursing home residents are physically restrained at some point during their 
stay in the nursing home (see the general discussion in Burton et a]. 1992)- 
hardly an enticement to entry! Further, inspections of  nursing homes in Cali- 439  Comment on Chapters 10 and  I1 
fornia and elsewhere have frequently uncovered substandard health conditions 
and poor living conditions. While not all nursing homes are unpleasant, it is 
hard to believe that most elderly would willingly move to one unless it seems 
necessary. Taking all of these arguments  into account, I believe it is hard to 
argue that the elderly enter nursing homes for their “entertainment” value, as 
is stated early in the paper. In fact, the only group of elderly for which unneces- 
sary entry seems even remotely  plausible  are the extreme poor (who would 
have nursing home stays subsidized by Medicaid),  who are not by  and large 
the target of  most  of  the policy  debates  (such as those  about cost  sharing) 
relevant to the material in this paper. 
To the extent that moral hazard among the elderly is a problem, states have 
established  preadmission  screening  guidelines  (see Jackson,  Eichorn,  and 
Blackman 1992); these guidelines do vary significantly across states and would 
be a natural set of variables to include in the models of this paper. 
If moral hazard is a problem, it is probably not associated with the elderly 
themselves, but with two related groups. One group are nursing home opera- 
tors. As Cutler and Sheiner remark, several recent studies, including one by 
Edward Norton, have shown that, when a vacant bed opens up, nursing homes 
will often pass over Medicaid or indigent patients for a significant period of 
time in the hope of attracting a private-pay  patient. The other group are the 
elderly’s family relatives, especially  children, who must care for the elderly 
who remain in the community. Of  course, if moral hazard by either of these 
two groups leads to excessive entry into nursing homes, this problem should 
be addressed; doing so, however, would require more complex models than 
those developed in this paper (involving game theory or multiperson decision 
theory rather than single-person decision theory). 
Cutler and Sheiner present interesting evidence on the way  in which long- 
term care costs are financed in various developed countries. They argue, I think 
persuasively, that in most countries these costs are usually shared between the 
elderly person’s  household  and either insurance or state funds, in contrast to 
acute care costs, which in most countries are nearly wholly insurance or state 
financed. 
I have three comments about this evidence. First, in thinking about the dif- 
ferences between  long-term care and acute care, it occurs to me that differ- 
ences in the stage of life at which these costs are incurred may go some way 
toward explaining why different kinds of insurance may be optimal. Acute care 
may be required at almost any stage in the life cycle, but is often needed when 
a person is younger, has dependents, and therefore has considerable demands 
on his or her financial resources (this of course is not entirely true, since some 
modest fraction of costs are spent in the last year or two of life and a significant 
amount of costs are spent on individuals over aged 65).  Because of these differ- 
ences, I would expect acute care costs to be almost wholly insured. In contrast, 
long-term care occurs predominantly  at the end of  life, when, other than for 
bequests, an  individual  may  have  only  moderate needs (again,  this  is  not 440  Comment on Chapters 10 and 11 
wholly  true, since the individual may  have a living  spouse). Thus long-term 
care costs may not need to be insured to the same degree as acute care costs. 
This argument is essentially one about the form of the utility function at differ- 
ent stages of  the life cycle. If  it  is correct, it suggests two things: first, that 
long-term care should not be fully insured, and second, that children may be 
an important beneficiary of any insurance which is offered. 
My second comment is simply that long-term care insurance contracts could 
be formally modeled using the sort of  set-up first developed by  Laffont  and 
Tirole, in which  cost sharing emerges  as the equilibrium  solution. My  final 
comment on long-term care insurance is that  such insurance is beginning to 
emerge, spurred on by state programs (see the article in the New York Tirnes, 
May 3, 1992). It would  be of  considerable  interest to explore the form this 
insurance is taking. and the role of state governments in promoting it. 
I now turn to a short discussion of Cutler and Sheiner’s results. Cutler and 
Sheiner focus on the variation across states in nursing home beds per capita. 
in the eligibility requirements for reimbursement for nursing home costs, and 
in the difference between Medicaid  reimbursement  rates and actual nursing 
home costs. They use data from the National Long-Term Care Survey to esti- 
mate logit models of the likelihood of a person of given characteristics entering 
a nursing home and, later in the paper, use this data to estimate multinomial 
logit models of a broader range of care arrangements, including nursing home 
care, paid at-home care, and family at-home care. 
I found the results presented in this paper extremely interesting, in large part 
because they raise a host of relevant new issues. Especially interesting are the 
attempt to link state policies  to nursing  home entry  decisions,  the  effort to 
study the interaction between state policies and such socioeconomic variables 
as income, and the multinomial logit models which estimate the relationship 
between nursing home utilization and home health care. 
However, there are a number of serious problems with how the models have 
been  specified, which lead me to believe that the results are only suggestive 
and not  conclusive.  One problem  relates to one of  the key  variables in  the 
study, the number of nursing beds per  1,000 population. At first glance, it is 
hard to understand why such a variable should be included in a model of nurs- 
ing home entry, and it is especially  hard  to interpret the result that entry is 
more likely when this variable is larger. Obviously, if more nursing home beds 
are available  in  a state, an individual  will be more likely to enter a nursing 
home bed, since these beds are in general occupied. In fact, if nursing home 
beds were always occupied, I am not sure there would be any behavioral inter- 
pretation for this variable. Since there is some slight vacancy  rate (but it is 
truly slight), which may vary across states with the number of beds per capita, 
it is possible for this variable’s coefficient to have a behavioral  interpretation. 
Nonetheless, it is the price of nursing home utilization which will determine 
occupancy, and this poses problems for the specification used, for several rea- 
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est thing is the differential between price and Medicaid reimbursement rates, 
which is not quite the same. Second, even in the same state, different individu- 
als will face different prices, depending on their eligibility; as far as I can tell, 
this problem is not directly addressed, though the models which interact state 
variables with income may do a reasonable job of capturing this effect. Finally, 
not all nursing homes charge the same price-presumably,  price varies with 
quality; data which matched individuals to specific nursing homes would thus 
be considerably more useful. 
A second problem with the models is that they implicitly attribute all varia- 
tions in nursing home utilization across states to the three measured state pol- 
icy variables. I believe this is quite misleading. There are many unmeasured 
characteristics of  states which may explain both the choice of  state variables 
and individual behavior. Because these characteristics are not included in the 
model, they may lead to biased estimates of the coefficients on characteristics 
which are included. 
Let me be slightly more precise about this last point. Support that there is a 
characteristic h which vanes across states; for example, h might be the percent- 
age of the population which is urban, the liberal-conservative  ranking of  the 
state, or any other characteristic which is likely to affect the need for and atti- 
tude toward nursing homes.  In  state j,  h  IS distributed  in the population  ac- 
cording to the density function g,(h).  Individual i in state j  has characteristic h,, 
which is, again, drawn from distribution gJh). The variable h can exert two 
distinct kinds of effects. On the one hand, for individual i, h, may affect the 
likelihood that i enters a nursing home. On the other hand, in the aggregate the 
voters in a state may choose a nursing home policy to reflect their preferences; 
if, for example, g,(h) has median El, nursing home policy in statej may be a 
function of g,, following the median voter rule. 
These two points can be made more precise as follows. First, suppose that 
the correct formulation of nursing home entry decisions is that 
Y, = 1 (enter)  if  5  0, 
= 0  else, 
where X, are the individual’s characteristics and  are the state policies in the 
state in which  i resides. Cutler and Sheiner have omitted the term h,. Further, 
they  have  implicitly  assumed  that  the expectation  of  h, is  zero or constant 
across all states. In fact, however, since g,  varies across states, the expectation 
of h, will also vary. As a result, this model is misspecified. Since it is a logit 
model, it is easy to show that the standard theorems  related to misspecified 
maximum likelihood models apply and that in general all coefficient estimates 
will be biased. The biases will be especially severe for -y,  since sl<,)  presumably 
depends on i),,,,  which is correlated with h,. 
Second, a more complete model would specify the determination of the state 442  Comment on Chapters 10 and 11 
policy rules, s,,  jointly with individuals’ decisions about nursing home entry. 
These two equations would be linked by the distribution g(h),  which is (it is 
hoped) exogenous and which is therefore a better candidate for the variation 
in nursing home practices across states. 
Having made all of these criticisms,  I must emphasize that the results of 
Cutler and Sheiner are very interesting, because they raise new issues, many 
of which are important in the debate about long-term care. It is my hope that 
in further work some of the shortcomings I have identified can be addressed. 
Concluding Comments 
In conclusion, let me return to the broad picture of long-term care statistics 
and policy  and make a few general remarks.  First, in evaluating alternative 
long-term care policy options, it must be recognized that any policy directed 
at some one option implicitly affects all the other alternatives. Thus, for ex- 
ample, a nursing home spenddown rule which protects elderly assets can im- 
plicitly affect the home health-care and life care industries. Ultimately, I hope 
researchers will be able to estimate models which incorporate the full range of 
living arrangements and health-care options, leading to estimates of the substi- 
tutibility among these options. 
Second, political economy can offer an important perspective on long-term 
care. A good example of  the power of  interest groups to influence policy has 
been the recent struggle in Florida between retirement communities and nurs- 
ing homes. Inhabitants of retirement  communities have “aged in place” and 
now wish to construct modest nursing home facilities. Their attempt to do so 
has been stymied (at least as of this writing) by the Florida nursing home in- 
dustry, which probably fears the competition  which might result from a less 
regulated environment. 
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